to both the area explored and the area from which the concepts hav been borrowed. When concepts and theories are transported fro one area of study to another, they sometimes undergo radk changes depending on the object of study and the context they hav been taken from. This process can lead to confusion and th criticism that this new application is based on a misunderstandin of their original meaning and application. This form of criticism grounded on a particular conception of science which suggests th concepts refer to a particular reality or to particular objects in straightforward and unproblematic way: concepts belong speci cally to the objects or reality studied and should not be detache from them and deployed elsewhere. The foundation for th conception of science is a belief that nature contains laws and a order which exist independently of the researcher. Lacan calls th laws and the "order of things" in nature, which supposedly ex independently of the human subject, a "knowledge in the real This Lacanian conception of modem science is crucial. It evokes h remarks on the subject of science from "Science and truth". H indicated there that modem science, which was born in the 17 century, was the precondition for the discovery of the subject psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1966:6-7) . How are we to understand thi Knowledge which exists in nature presupposes a subject for who this knowledge is meaningful. It also implies a subject who has desire to know this knowledge. This subject is called the "subject science" and it is the subject upon which psychoanalysis operate Modem science made the decision to find certainty in the object an concentrated its efforts exclusively there. Freud discovered, unde lying this search for certainty, a doubting subject and set himself t enormous task of studying the relationship between this subject an the object. In this task he stumbled upon the problem of meanin and language as the elements which connect the two, but which al obscure their relationship at the same time.
Towards the end of the 19th century Freud realized th language is an important part of the human psyche. He observ that the psyche is structured and that using language in certa ways can establish a change in people. Asking people to "fre associate" he found the focus and emphasis of their speech to forever shifting. One thing would always lead to another, nev settling onto something specific. Freud had cliscovered displaceme is lost when we have to tear ourselves awa origin; it represents an original satisfaction th can be represented initially in hallucination words. Freud had no conceptual tools at his these discoveries in a theory of language; include the subject and this object. Not that th in his life-time, he just did not know about it.
I the object, the subject and language have far re for our understanding of science and the que clinical work.
The relationship between the subject of sc object of study is of an impotent nature, becau step in scientific research leads to the further re instance, advances in neuroscience and neurop only seem to lead to the discoveries of ever mo and newer forms of interactions between them discoveries take us any further in our understa of psychopathology'> But that is not all. The science retreats, the more the subject of sc forward. TItis situation is absolutely antithe scientific objectivity. A remark by John H Neuropharmacology at Cambridge University illustration of this point: You know you have to be convinced, you rea convinced in science that you are right. lhls impartial scientist assembling facts in order to esis is absolute balderdash. Karl Popper coul further from the truth. You have got to be co think most scientists are deluded. [Healy, 1996: We could conclude from this remark that, as does not have much time for the painstaking a of gathering data using the empirical method research, which according to Popper, should one's scientific work providing that this hap continous falsification of hypotheses. The history of psychiatry in the 19th and 20th centuries is history of the continuous attempt and failure to isolate functional area of the psyche which would give a conceptual u and clarity to the differential clinic of psychopathological clisorde This failure causes psychiatry to revert back to the relative securit nosological systems and classifications which are meant to gras clinical reality. The security provided by nosology and classifica is the illusion of control and mastery over something which unknown or not understood and it is indeed an illusion beca nosological names never correspond to empirical reality; in fact t rather obscure that reality (Verhaeghe, 1994:62) . The latest perhaps best known of these classifications is the DSM system (I-
The Dmgnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
In rela to such diagnostic classification systems, Dany Nobus writes:
The categories of mental disorders included in the diagnostic manuals function as prototypical examples of states of psychic illness that can be detennined through observation and deduction.
Nevertheless, the univocal empirical recognition and delineation o mental disorders remains a psychiatric sign, since a perfect objectivity and a fully adequate categorical system are impossible to realize. Current diagnostic systems for mental disorders have many epistemological shortcomings, which are often acknowledged by psychiatrists themselves, but they continue to be used, in many cases because professionals are convinced that there is nothing better available. Of course the question is what this better thing would be: a more guaranteed objectivity through a system with more or less differentiations, or a radically different approach? [Nobus, 1997:53] It is very important to look at the possibility of developin radically different approach to our understanding of psychopat ogy and especially to addiction (as one of the manifestation psychopathology) which, of all the mental pathologies, is argua the one that occurs most frequently. This radically diffe approach is a necessity, because the attempt to find certainty the object (of clinical reality), through naming and categorizat will only lead to a further retreat of this o separation between subject and object. But ther of hoping that a similar epistemological shif psychiatry and psychopathology as took place towards the end of the 18th century.
Positivist science, which depends on the and classification of empirical reality, neverthe properly constituting itself as a science, it w transition as that which characterizes the em clinical medicine. That means that it hope classification of observations to the postulatio functional dynamic of which these observation manifestations. What the history of psychopa oscillation between elaborate classification sy DSM, and the attempt to isolate from this a dif on functional unities. Up to now, this atte differential clinic based on functional unities itself in the domain of psychopathology.
Paul Verhaeghe has divided approaches to the 18th and 19th century into two broad ca 1994:74-97). I will outline some aspects of because in some respects the ideas put forwa but untranslated Dutch text, converge with the sketched and, more importantly, will lead to Verhaeghe makes a distinction between what dream of positive-science" and the "moral tre
The first is the paradigm of reductionist m roots that go back to Democritus who postulate be reduced to fundamental particles. The basic by Bayle, is that every psychopathology shou organic cause (or be based on a disorder in on unity) and should therefore be organically trea discovery of neuraleptica in the early 1950s gav idea of organic causation. The logic was as substances can have an effect on pathological cause of this behaviour must surely be chemical of the consequences of this scientific way of subject is excluded. The illness is defined as a no the patient is only its vehicle. In fact, even as a an interference in the understanding of the nature of the disease. subject is a passive victim of an organic agent and carries responsibility whatsoever for his or her mental problem or dise
The second paradigm, the moral paradigm, has roots in the century before Christ when the sophist Protagoras postulated all perceptions could be reduced to their subjective determina and can therefore only contain an individual truth (for instance, people seeing the same thing does not mean that they experien in the same way). Despite this position, Protagoras does accept certain perceptions are better than others: the perceptions of hea people are better than those of sick people. Better perceptions those that have better factual consequences. This leads to a para involving the simultaneous claims that perceptions are always jective, and that some perceptions have better "factual" (objec consequences than others. The inevitable consequence of paradox is that, despite the aspect of subjectivity, one depend an authority, or a master who knows, for knowledge about difference between good and bad perceptions. The rele consequences of this concept were the special institutions crea such as psychiatric asylums and hospitals which were headed master or "chef de clinique" who would know what is good for patient. Essentially, diagnosis and treatment within the m paradigm come down to this: people become mentally ill as a r of sick-making perceptions or ideas, and treatment is done in a hea environment with the help of a masterful figure. In other wo treatment takes place within a discourse in which there is no place fo choices, desires and responsibilities of the subject. This paradigm is stro reflected in today's social/psychological approach.
It is striking that both paradigms rely on external factors. In first paradigm the subject is the victim of an organic factor an the second paradigm the environment is responSible for problem of the subject. Consequently, this subject is an "acciden component in the therapeutic mechanism and the treatment t place despite his or her responSibility.
But psychopathology has not managed to reduce itself in stable way to the functional systems of the brain and their disord nor has it managed to grasp clinical reality in a perfect unequivocal language, reminiscent of the famous statement of 18th century sensualist Condillac, who said: Une science parfaite s above all, is the constant attempt to exclu subjectivity (of both clinician and patient) from Psychopathology tries to find certainty in an uns and in the process it manages to ignore the subject and object and between subject (of the c In terms of a scientific conception of ps treatment of psychopathology, the aforemen including classificatory medicine and func medicine-have in common the fact that the su and clinician) stands excluded in relation to th relation to the treatment. That surely must because is it not the subject who is happy or pleasure or pain, who suffers or manages to av to die and accept this or not, who will be otherness of-and within-the Other sex, and, w only one who knows-whether he or she is co or not-the true nature of their relationship feelings, thoughts, experiences and responsibili that these thoughts, experiences and their ca dently of us? Or can we be told precisely how live with-these experiences by persons who experiences themselves? What is interesting abo that they defy both an objective and a moral a demand an ethical response. For instance, positively known nor is it good or bad. All w will have to come to terms with the fact that that that fact is beyond good or bad. The ethica subjects to reconcile themselves with this fact successful outcome of this process, because su reached an external objective or ideal.
The Freudian Intervention
Freud shifted emphasis from the eye to the practice. The difference between seeing and 270 l ACAN & SCI ENCE enormous. What you see is what you see, but when you listen you can hear things. Things that are hiddeI1' from the eye, things that have mearung or-when not understood-can cause distress. What Freud heard was that mearung is not always obvious, nor the language that produces it. Freud heard the existence of the unconscious. This discovery of the unconscious allowed him to generate a psychopathological clinic based on the dialectical interaction of subjectivity and clinical structure, thus undermining any attempt at strict differentiation and separation of subject and object in the psychoanalytic arena. This dialectical interaction transforms the classical psychiatric nosography and provides it with the possibility of a theoretical unity. This is however a form of unity that is not acceptable to the pretensions of objective and empirical science who prefer instead the unity of the observable object and the unity of word or concept and thing. The preference for this kind of unity in objective and empirical science, so prevalent also in the domain of psychiatry and psychopathology, has led to an impasse, especially in the area of clinical diagnosis 6 The failure to create a diagnostic system that classifies symptoms and syndromes of mental disorders on the basis of a precisely locatable causation, a uniform etiology and an accurate prognosis for each disorder, i.e., the failure to create a diagnostic system that matches up perfectly with clinical reality, has become blatantly obvious in clinical practice. Moving away from diagnosis and treatment, psychiatry, to a large extent, has become a practice of patient management and patient care. And where this transformation has not taken place (yet), psychiatry and clinical diagnosis are largely a practice of intuition based on personal experience. Verhaeghe writes:
Every clinician has experienced in his life a certain amount of anxiety, depression, relationship p roblems, problems in growing up, etc. As long as w hat he encounters in his client is situated within the limits of his own experience, he will consider this more than likely as "normal". However, if w hat he encounters in his client is situated outside his quantitative field of experiences, he will suddenly diagnose it as pathological and if it is situated outside his qualitative field of experiences, the diagnosis will become psychosis. [Verhaeghe, 1994:35] There are simply no absolute criteria available that would neatly normality and abnormality-is based on the fact outside language that can guarantee the ab truthfulness of these criteria. Therefore the un category (or concept) and clinical reality (o established. There is no a priori corresponde orders. In psychoanalysis there is really only on or one criterion for truth, and that is that the subject in language entails the confrontation of trauma of a lack. All subjects, in their own way, with that fact. Everything the subject does, wh outside language, is to be understood as the atte trauma of the lack.
Considering the impasse in clinical psyc pathology in terms of failing to develop a diagnosis and treatment (in psychiatry treatme dependent on making the correct diagnosis), it to look at the possibility of applying the psychoanalysis to the clinical area of addiction area is it more obvious that the relationship object can be very problematic and extremely reason it makes sense to apply a theory that is b ship between the subject and object and to appl that centres around the different structures, m that characterize this relationship. For insta establish a differential diagnosis of perver description and classification of sexual beha quences and the contexts in which they occ precisely because it ignored the clinical structu between the subject and the (sexual) object (N Ternrnerman, 1994:126, 127; Verhaeghe, 1994 reason why it makes sense to consider the p psychoanalysis can make to the area of 'ad contributions made by objective and empirical have so far only led to unsatisfactory results th inconsistency. A coherent diagnosis of addic l ACAN & SCIENCE description of addictive/compulsive behaviours (drug taking, alcohol consumption), the addictive/toxic characteristics of drugs and alcohol (and their effects on the psyche, soma and social environment), and the course and development of the addictive disorder / disease--has not been succesfully realized. Nor has it been possible to establish a precise cause-and-effect relationship between addiction and specific psychological characteristics, social factors or medical/organic anomalies that can explain the phenomenon of addiction in a uniform way?
It appears that something in relation to addiction is indeterminate. In other words, it is very difficult to positively define either addiction or drugs themselves (including alcohol). Perhaps the most commonsense definition of a drug is that it is a substance which when incorporated produces alterations of the mind and the body. 1hls definition makes so much sense that it has no explanatory value. Coffee, tea, tobacco, sugar, water, food, prescription drugs, illegal drugs, can all be incorporated and may even act as drugs. A lot of people are addicted to alcohol, but can we say that it is a drug? Is it perhaps a poison, or a food? Particular drugs taken in certain doses can become poisons but in other doses function as remedies (Plato already hinted at this ambiguity of the pharrmlkon). Does a drug become a medicine when it is made available only by medical prescription (it seems that marijuana is now going to be used for the medical treatment of glaucoma, whilst amphetamines travelled the other direction by crossing over from being legal to being illegal) and what exactly is the difference between prozac and ecstacy besides the legal aspect? (Lenson, 1995:4) . The history of legislation of drugs shows that, in terms of function and effects of drugs, the law is arbitrary. Despite these indeterminate and undefinable aspects of drugs and drug-taking we definitely know that addictions exist. The real problem is how to study them. Empirical science relies for its assertions on statistically significant data gathered from so-called representative samples. 1hls approach is therefore never in a position to address the relationship between drug (object) and addict (subject). A consequence of the empirical method is the assumption that drugs cause uniform effects implying that the effects are only related to the drugs and indeed have nothing to do with the relationship between the object-drug and the subject-user of the drug. Empirical science is forced, by its methodology, to avoid considering the possibility that toxicity and the effect of drugs are inherent to the subject. This conception fails because drugs are profoundly ambiguous in both their function and their effect. They can function as poisons or as remedies. Concerning their effect, it is a well-known fact that drugs and alcohol can affect people differently and can affect the same person differently at different times. In other words neither function nor effect is uniform 8 Objective and empirical research fails in the area of addiction because the subject (yet again) throws a spanner in the works. Or perhaps it is better to say that the subject is not allowed to put in its spoke. Alain Delrieu, who published a very detailed study of more than 400 written texts on addiction published in the 19th and 20th century to which he gave the title L'Inconsistance de fa Toxicomanie (The Inconsistency of Addiction), concluded: "Despite the multiplicity of scientific disciplines which are interested in this theme, it is actually impossible to respond in a straightforward way to two questions which obsess the adult world, 'why do so many young people take drugs?' and 'who are those who take drugs?' " (Delrieu, 1988:101, my translation) . In other words, addiction exists, but there is no such person as the (typical) addict. This is precisely the point Markos Zafiropoulos refers to with his book title The Addict does not Exist." Despite the uniform social, legal and medical manifestation of addiction, the relationship between addiction and the subject is neither uniform nor predictable in any way. Listening to the discourse of addiction is perhaps a way out of the impasse. That means listening to the speaking subject who is addicted and that implies a listening beyond a general symptomatology. But what can we say about some of what has been heard so far?
Civilization and its toxicomanias-rudiments for a differential diagnosis of addiction based on the concept of "administration"
In the very last pages of Civifiwtion and its Discontents Freud diagnoses the disorder in human civilization in a way that would not be acceptable to psychiatry. In his observation of civilization he has come to the conclusion that it is an irrefutable fact that man wants happiness, but cannot have it. (Freud, 1930:145) . In other words, man is destined to suffer. Earlier on in the article he wrote:
But the most interesting methods of averting' suffering are those which seek to influence our own organism. In the last analysis, all suffering is nothing else than sensation; it only exists in so far as we feel it, and we only feel it in consequence of certain ways in which our organism is regulated. The crudest, but also the most effective among these methods of influence is the chemical one-intoxication. [Freud, 1930:78J The connection, established by Freud here, between suffering, the regulation of our bodies and intoxication is extremely interesting and demands further exploration. The immediate context from which this quote is taken is crucial for an understanding of the problem of addiction in the field of psychoanalysis. I will therefore explore this context in some detail here. Freud indicates that suffering threatens us from three directions: our bodies, the external world and our relations to others (Freud, 1930:77) . This last source causes us most suffering. Isolating ourselves from others is thus one solution to our problems. Drugs and alcohol can provide us with pleasure, but they can also render us incapable of " receiving unpleasurable impulses". These two effects appear to be intimately connected with each other. Both the pleasure these " foreign substances" can generate and the halt they can call to unpleasurable impulses, whether they come from within or outside the organism, are independent of the Other. Freud writes: "The service rendered by intoxicating media in the struggle for happiness and in keeping misery at a distance is so highly prized as a benefit that individuals and peoples alike have given them an established place in the economies of their libido" (Freud, 1930:78) . Implied in this statement and its wider context we already encounter the rudiments for a possible differential diagnosis of addiction which is not based on observation of empirical material, but is based on a certain economy and distribution of pleasure and jouissance. The economy and distribution of jouissance result from the constitution of the subject in language (or the field of the Other). In an article entitled "Libido and toxic substance", I have argued how the constitution of the subject in language is able to represent " certain ways in which our organism is regulated", how different forms of jouissance result from this process, and how certain distributions of these forms can lead to toxicity and indeed cause suffering, pain and anxiety (Loose, 1996:32-43 ). I will briefly outline that argument here.
jouissance, a kind of enjoyment that is different of immediate experience and total vitality. The Signifier causes a differentiation of jouissance. B than that! It produces a subject, it allows this sub turns the being of a real organism into a body Freud's point of departure was that the constitu subject is not a very successful process and Lac that this failure also applies to the body. Langua is structurally incomplete and because of that fa only partially symbolized body in language. The ized) parts of the body can become cause for su sense they have a toxic effect.
lo The use of drug serve as an attempt to regulate this toxicity important to note that the real toxicity is not situ or drugs but in the body." The signifier also cr subject by cutting him off from a primordia characterizes the dual unity with the mother oceanic feeling). This is known as symbolic ca castration leaves the subject unsatisfied beca something more than ordinary pleasure or jouissa desire threatens to be realized, the subject will p his annihilation. The realm beyond ordinary plea the death-drive. Drugs and alcohol can functi break with ordinary (thus limited) pleasure (or and produce something more or indeed, occa function as barriers against the lethal or toxi ordinary pleasure which threatens to annihilate latter case, the toxicity is not situated in the ch subject. On top of this the introduction of the speech which never reaches its full potentia!.12 F it is inevitable that the subject not only desires things, but will also suffer and experience anxiety shows that in a Lacanian conception of the s alcohol can function differently for different peop relationship to jouissance, pleasure, anxiety, pain a lACAN & SCIEN C E undoubtedly the case that this has consequences for treatment, a the effect of alcohol and drugs will be (at least to some degre determined by the way they function for the subject. Another important aspect of addiction, which Freud makes qui explicit in Civilization and its Discontents, is his insistence on the fa that addiction is a social symptom. He writes:
We owe to such media not merely the immediate yield of pleasure, but also a greatly desired degree of independence from the external world. For one knows that, with the help of this "drowner of cares" one can at any time withdraw from the pressures of reality and find refuge in a world of one's own with better conditions of sensibility.
As is well known, it is precisely this property of intoxicants which also determines their danger and their injuriousness. [Freud, 1930:78] Addiction as a social symptom creates a specific social bond an forms a particular structure. All three clirtical structures of th subject in psychoanalysis form social bonds and are relational nature; they orient the subject in relation to the Other. These thre positions in language represent three different ways in whic subjects can manage with-or orientate themselves to-the origin structural trauma or lack. If it is permissible to define the clirtic structures (and addiction) with only a few words based not on th results of psychological measurement, but on a structural concep tion of the relationship between the subject and Other, then we ca say the following:
• Neurosis addresses the Other with a question. That means th the subject has unconsciously accepted symbolic castration an its consequence; it takes responsibility for the lack, it renounce primordial real jouissance, puts up with ordinary pleasure an with the inevitable guilt and anxiety.
• Perversion dresses the Other with an object. That means that th subject sometimes acknowledges the lack and at other time refuses this. The mother is not lacking and in order to disavo this fact (and ultimately symbolic castration), the subje replaces the lack with an object. Primordial real jouissance given up, but a particular jouissance related to a specific obje comes in its place. Anxiety and guilt are often hidden an therefore less obvious in this structure.
\ , and hallucinations. Arudety and guilt are structure.
• Addiction is an independence of the Other relationship between the subject and the O addiction is something else (and somew castration and lack can be accepted, disav the subject; addiction seeks administratio are hidden at times, but paradoxically ma (hidden) presence.
Administration refers to an important conce value and clinical application are not imm neurosis is based on the mechanism of repre disavowal and psychosis on foreclosure, th addiction on the mechanism of administration, o considered to function at a different level than Administration is not a mechanism that functio subject; it functions at the level of the (social does not imply that it exists without a relatio The mechanism of administration does not de subject is constituted in the field of the Other. I the symptom functions in relation to the Other that is dependent on the position of the subject When I propose that addiction maintains an Other, I imply that it is an attempt to adm independently of the Other. Jouissance here ref pleasure that makes life coherent (Freud's pleasure principle) and to pleasure that is n normal limitations of human culture or soci coherent life (Freud's beyond of the pleas dynamic tension between these two human te of the failure of the pleasure principle and is fu nature. It was already an object of serious c Stoics and Epicurians (the two opposing schoo in ancient Greece) and it lies at the heart of (the human problem of addiction. The term administration is ased in three ways: (1) to govern or regulate; (2) to manage as a substitute; and (3) to dispense o supply. Addiction can be related to the three clinical structures o psychosis, neurosis and perversion. But it can also be related to Freud's (often forgotten) clinical category of the actual neuroses and that would make addiction a clinical entity which is separat from the clinical structures and their symptoms. This clinica category of the actual neuroses can also play an important role in the development of a differential diagnosis of addiction 13 Th chemical processing of actual neurosis is a fourth form of addiction and it is a form of addiction that has its own relationship modality vis-d-vis the Other. This relationship modality is characterized by the independent adminstration of jouissance which functions as th governing or regulation of an unbearable real; a real that threatens to annihilate the subject in actual neurosis.14 In psychosis, the foreclosure of language (or the rejection o symbolic castration) results in a position of the subject as an objec or "Thing" for or in the Other. The lack, which is produced by th constitution of the subject in language, is not produced for th psychotic subject, precisely because he or she is foreclosed from language. This psychotic subject will be confronted with a massiv presence of the real; an unbearable "too much" of something. Th defensive reaction of the subject against this massive immediat presence of real jouissance, can take the form of a "suppletion symptom" or what Lacan calls a "sinthOme" in Seminar XXIl (Lacan, 1977 (Lacan, :lecture of 18-11-1975 . The other solution available to the psychotic subject is to develop a delusion against th massiveness of the real. A delusion is constructed on the basis o language; it is a signifying system. But language function differently for the psychotic subject than for the neurotic (o perverse) subject. For the latter, language contains a structural lack which makes the signifiers continually shift as the subject tries to find certainty about a truth that always seems to escape. For th psychotic, language (which is the material for the delusiona system) has to be complete in order to form a defense against th real. Language functions as a protective wall which is meant to b impenetrable. That is why psychotics "know for sure". It is or delusional system available, the psychotic body will be completely at the mercy of t overwhelmed or invaded by jouissance. This (catatonic) form of psychosis. Here we find th psychosis and addiction. In the event of the sig function as a protection against the invasion o always has recourse to the route of the body v Addiction here is a form of management (of jou with drugs and alcohol as forms of self med encounter some of the chronic addictions.
In neurosis and perversion the mechanis disavowal result in a fundamental dissatisfact the pleasure principle. What lies beyond this always "too much" and yet the absence of "never enough", a plus-de-jouir (more-to-be-e situate one of the few (maybe the only) refere addiction: "everything which permits the esca (to the phallus) is clearly very welcome, that success of drugs, for instance; there is no othe than this one: it is what permits to break the Willie" (Lacan, 1976:263-270, my translation) that addiction is an attempt to break away f and an attempt to turn the pleasure princ operation through the refusa l of symbolic c form of the subject dispensing with the fa principle by supplying himself with an addi drug or alcohol here functions as an "objec which allows the subject to avoid the always p with the desire of the Other and sustains in h is able to attain the lost "object-<:ause-of-desir access to jouissance for the subject, enabling h detour via the Other because it can be adm therefore essentially oral in nature and dro structured "formations of the unconscious"
Despite the attempt of neurotic (and perverse) addicts to b away from phallic jouissance in an act that takes place independ of the Other, it is undoubtedly the case that this act is, at the time, an appeal to the Other as it was the encounter betwee subject and the Other that produced the dissatisfaction of haVi put up with limited pleasure and desire. In other words, the a neurotic and perverse addicts is an appeal to the Other in the of a complaint. The discourse or speech of addicts is fu complaints. A complaint is a question, a demand directed a Other. It is a demand to be relieved of suffering; a demand for a demand for a solution to the problem of desire. The complai an expression of pain and suffering also contains an accusatio an attribution of the cause of this pain and suffering to an ext source. TItis external source is the Other. The human dilemm that the Other is indeed the cause of the subject's suffering, bu subject will always have to take responsibility for dealing and l with this fact. Addiction, based on neurotic or perverse struct attempts to avoid this problematic and fundamental hu dilemma, by repeating this dilemma at a different level and way which is utterly destructive. On the one hand addi functions independently of the Other for the subject, whilst o other hand the subject is dependent on the act of repetitive taking. In terms of treatment, this act should be interpreted a appeal for help and as an analysable symptom. The problem is the independent function (vis-ii-vis the Other) of addiction cr complications for the transference. Addicted subjects will ten escape the encounter with the desire of the Other (which therapeutic or analytic relationship provokes), by taking dru alcohol in order to avoid the anxieties and uncertainties tha inherent to the therapeutic process.
It is without doubt the case that these different form addiction have implications for the direction of treatment. Th the reason why a diagnosis of addiction which includes the su is of crucial importance for intervention in the field of addiction essential to know what we are dealing with and to that effec need theory to guide a clinic that includes addiction. TItis is a which allows the subject to find or create a different orient towards jouissance and the real via the object and signifier o transference. The only problem is that the real of psychoana addiction IieTFl[et"d as an ,l) rClblem is that such a thing as evidence an at some of the facts of huma observed. At times people a doubt about that and this is the very end of Civilization Men have gained control o that with their help they w one another to the last m large part of their current of anxiety. [Freud, 1930:14 We stated before that man This is a fact observed by obviously ample evidence fact is theoretical. The reas theoretically is that the ex explain this fact. Freud's irreducible real element in pain and suffering. This rea stake in science. This rea science (statistics do not he by giving the observed dat the real of modern scien nological products). The re kind of knowledge or else object in the real. But neithe of the human subject whi civilization. Lacan says: "It is clear that th~ knowledge imputed something in the real, whether one calls that God or something els has in no way anything to do with the knowledge wruch articulat itself especially from litis, that there is a being who speaks" (Laca 1998:21, my translation) . Knowledge imputed to the real in scien is not the knowledge related to the real of the unconscious of th subject. The real of the unconscious has a relationsrup to meanin because it wants to find an expression of an inexpressible jouissanc This distinction between the real of science and the real of psych analysis is essential and-paraphrasing Eric Laurent-it is extreme important to convince science of the fact that there is another for of real than the one of science (Laurent, 1998:42) . This is the fact th man has to be tom from rus place of origin wruch causes differentiation in-and problematic distribution of-jouissance the subject. Civilization is an attempt to regulate litis distribution; is in that sense "a mode of jouissance, and even a common mode jouissance, a systematical distribution of the ways and means jouir" (Miller, 1998:25) . There is no doubt about the fact that th products and gadgets of modem science are very effective ways producing, regulating and distributing jouissance.
Freud's theoretical explanation for man's incapacity to be happ is that man is caught between an egoistic urge for happiness and cultural urge for unity in human kind. Man is unhappy because th latter urge has pushed the former into the background (Freu 1930:142,143) . These two opposing urges represent the individu and cultural super-ego (pp. 141,142). Freud's diagnosis that mankin has become neurotic was based (as we stated in the introduction litis chapter) on the influence of the cultural urges. In other word man's neurosis and lack of happiness are based on the dominance the cultural super-ego over the individual super-ego. Freud's cultur super-ego is one that forbids, restricts, sets ideals, provides rules an so on. It causes unhappiness because the demands of the cultur Other force the subject to renounce its claim for individual happines This does not seem to tally with today's preoccupation wi happiness, enjoyment, (extreme) pleasure, individual lifestyles an success. J.-A. Miller writes:
Can we speak today of a major neurosis of our times? If one was able to do it, one could say that its principal determinant is the do pose the questions and go about it in a logical way." Howeve does not consider himself to be one of those. He knows that delu are dangerous, but a good scientist should be able to recognize (Healy, 1996:545) .
5. See Foucault (1973) passim.
6. The preference for this kind of unity in psychiatry (and psychopha cology) was expressed very well by Tom Ban, Professor of Psychia Vanderbilt University, when he said: "The only reason to have con is to be able to commW1icate, and if we have problems using a co in comnltmicating, we might just as well throw out such a concept.
if the dismissed concept leaves a void one should replace it with which corresponds more with the real world (Healy, 1996:595) . 7. As an illustration of the failure to establish a coherent diagnosis a willorm explanation for addiction the reader is referred to an exc and detailed summary of the psychiatric classifications of addicti Ylary McMurran (1994:19-21 11. A psychoanalytic conception of toxicity does not necessarily con toxicity to be inherent to drugs or alcohol, but can indicate any that is detrimental to the subject. Toxicity, in this view, is therefo inevitable aspect of human existence. It is nevertheless something which the subject has to distance himself as much as possible. To in psychoanalysis includes the real (of the body), the realm of the d drive beyond the pleasure~principle, but also, for instance, sugge words spoken in a hypnotic relationship. See also in this respect S Le Poulichet's excellent book Toxicomanies et Psychanalyse (1987:7- 12. This full potential is the ideal of communication which is the abil say it all so that nothing needs to be said anymore. 13. From 1892 onwards Freud begins to develop a structural psychopa ogy. On the one hand he establishes the psychoneuroses (initial called these the neuropsychoses of defence) and on the other han develops the category of the actual neuroses. The actual neurose characterized by an anxiety against which the subject cannot d the drug connects the (Byck, 1974: lid IlSp .. :t of the (Lacan, phallic consider ~"'thting from Toxicity (inibiallv he hand he successful defence system against anxiety.
relative because psychoneurotics of course als fact, to be anxious is even their hallmark. Ther in quality: psychoneurotic anxiety is more c whelming. Psychoneurotic anxiety is contained or symbolic processing of an original trauma
The cause of anxiety is the same for the a difference is that a symbolization or psychic p trauma never took place. Actual neurosis is neurotic development in the subject. The actua reaction to the direct confrontation with th processing is lacking in essential points. Th continous processing of this traumatic re symptoms (i.e., symbolically structured format The psychoneuroses are an attempt to cure the actua l neuroses lack this type of cure becau symptom. One way out of the actual neurotic the organism with drugs and alcohol. This solu the body, which manages to avoid the encount proof. Any solution that is able to avoid th guaranteed fool-proof. The problem is that the s heavy price. In order to maintain the solu addiction, because it is a solution without the p chemical intoxication is not a symptom that c therefore not be resolved. Some chronic addic actual neurosis. Addiction can be found in all and therefore addiction will acquire a function in each of these structures. 14. The real toxicity in addiction, when consider entity (by being related to actual neurosis), is n alcohol itself, but concerns that jouissance of the devour the subject when the phallic or sexual is unable to contain it. In "Libido and toxic su this case, addiction takes the fonn of a kind of " or regulates, in a homeostatic movement, the jouissance of the Other (Loose, 1996:40-42) . A mechanism, replaces the function of the sign barrier against an anxiety which results from t which overwhelms the subject when somethin psychically processed or symbolized. This for
